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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case in which DefendantIAppellant (hereafter "Lombard") was charged 
with one count of Burglary and one count of Grand Theft. A written Rule 11 Plea Agreement was 
ejected by the District Court and Lombard was subsequently found guilty on both counts by a jury. 
;ubsequently Lombard was sentenced and ordered to pay restitution. This Appeal takes issue with 
he District Court's rejection of the Rule 1 1 Plea Agreement, Lombard's Sentencing, and the District 
2ourt's Order for Restitution. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Information in this case was filed April 15,2008, charging Lombard with one count of 
iurglary and one count of Grand Theft resulting from alleged conduct while employed with Mary 
inn's Grocery (owned by Don and Cammie Ebert) in Weippe, Idaho. (R. pp. 10-1 1). 
After extensive negotiations, the Plaintiff/Respondent (hereafter "State") and Lombard 
ntered into a written Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R. pp. 99-101). Pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea 
igreement, Lombard would have entered a guilty plea to Grand Theft and the State would have then 
ismissed the Burglary count. Id in exchange for the guilty plea, Lombard would have been 
ntitled to ask for a withheld judgment, any incarceration would not have exceeded six months at 
he county jail, fines and costs would have been set by the court, the length and term of probation 
iould be set by the court, and Lombard would have paid $20,000 in restitution. Id 
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However on December 1,2008, the District Court rejected the Rule 1 1 Plea Agreement and ordered 
the case to jury trial because Lombard would not admit to taking $20,000. (See Tr. pp. 4-1 1). At 
the change of plea hearing the District Court stated that it would not impose restitution of $20,000 
"unless there's an admission that that's what she did. And ifthere's not, then we'll go to trial." (Tr. 
p. 9 ins. 16-19. 
A jury trial was subsequently held on January 11-13,2009. Part of the evidence that was 
introduced at trial was a taped conversation that Lombard had with Detective Sergeant Jared of the 
Clearwater County Sheriffs Office on the day of her arrest September 9th, 2007. During this 
:onversation, Lombard admitted to taking cash while at work from Mary Ann's Grocery beginning 
the end of June of 2007. (Tr. p. 232 Ins. 7-21) Lombard admitted to taking $50 to $60 dollars a day 
3ut she also stated that she did not take cash every day and did not always take cash when she hit 
.he no sale button on the cash register. Id Subsequently on January 1 3th, 2009, the jury found 
Lombard guilty of Burglary and Grand Theft. 
On March 23,2009, the District Court sentenced Lombard to concurrent terms of not less 
han 2 !A years nor more than 8 years with the District Court retaining jurisdiction. (R pp. 121-23). 
The PSI recommended local incarceration followed by supervisedprobation. (Tr. p. 265 ins. 19-20). 
The District Court set a restitution hearing for April 20, 2009. Id. 
On April 20,2009, the State filed an Affidavit for Restitution. (See R. pp. 108-1 5). Attached 
o this Affidavit is a letter from Don and Camlnie Ebert stating that they believed that Lombard 
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allegedly stole at least $1 00,000. (R. p. I 1 1). The Ebert letter offers no support for this conclusion. 
Also attached to the Affidavit were two separate statistical calculations prepared by Don Ebert. (R. 
pp. 112-13). 
At the restitution hearing, over Lombard's objection, Don Ebert testified with regards to his 
statistical calculations. (See Tr. pgs. 286-297). The District Court overruled Lombard's objection 
that restitution is required to be established by apreponderance of the evidence and that actual loss 
needs to be based on substantial evidence and that statistical average or assumptions are not 
substantial evidence for purpose of determining arestitution amount. (Tr. pg. 289 ins. 14-25, pg. 290 
Ins. 1-2). 
At the hearing, Don Ebert testified that he could not put a black or white number on how 
much Lombard allegedly took. (Tr. pg. 290 Ins. 5-6). At the hearing, he also testified that he could 
not identify the exact date that allegedly Lombard began taking money from the store, how many 
times Lombard allegedly took money from the store, and the exact amount for each transaction that 
was allegedly taken. (Tr. pg. 293 ins. 4-16). 
During the trial, Don Ebert also testified that there were legitimate reasons for no sale 
transactions to occur on the cash register slip, that the number of legitimate no sale transactions each 
day varied, that different employees used the same till during a shift, and that it was ilnpossible to 
determine from the cash register slip which employee entered a no sale transaction. (See Tr. pgs. 
173-177). 
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In deciding the restitution amount the District Court took "the more conservative approach, 
simply because it seems awfully hard for any reasonable person to question that amount." (Tr. pg. 
305 ins 3-6). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A) Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in ordering a restitution 
amount that was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is thus not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
B) Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in sentencing Verna Lombard 
by considering facts not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
ARGUMENT 
On a preliminary note, this case has always been about restitution. The Defendant in this 
case, Verna Lombard, never denied that she engaged in inappropriate conduct while working for 
Mary Ann's Grocery. In fact, she admitted to Sergeant Detective Mitch Jared on the very day in 
September of 2007 that she was arrested that she had been taking money from the store since the end 
of June of 2007 (actually she could not remember if it started the end of June or the first part of July). 
She admitted that she had taken $50 to $60 dollars a day. She also stated that she did not take every 
single day that she worked since she had started taking in June or July. Further she stated that 
sometimes when she hit no sale on the cash register she did not take any moncy. The importance, 
or alleged importance, of a no sale on the cash register will be addressed in depth shortly. 
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This case has always been about restitution, or maybe more accurately, the lack of credible 
substantiated evidence regarding a restitution amount. It must be emphasized that Vema Lombard 
fully realizes that she should have to pay restitution, however, just as importantly, and this is equally 
true to all people whether they are paying or receiving restitution, is that the amount of restitution 
in a criminal case needs to be based on the actual loss of the victim, not some statistical analysis 
based on assumptions. Criminal defendants are required to pay only what the actual loss was, or an 
smount that a defendant agreed to pay. Criminal defendants are not required to pay amounts based 
on assumptions. Victims are entitled to the amount of actual loss, or maybe even more if a defendant 
agrees, but are not entitled to a windfall. While it should never pay to be a criminal, it should 
likewise never pay to be a victim. 
This case should have been resolved pursuant to the parties' written Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement. The parties negotiated extensively in coming to the Agreement. Both sides, including 
[he victims, were satisfied with the Agreement hence the presentation of the signed Agreement to 
the District Court. A restitution amount was agreed to and all sides benefitted. From Verna 
Lombard's perspective, she got the opportunity to ask for a withheld judgment, got one count 
iismissed, got the opportunity to argue for the length of local incarceration, and knew what the exact 
mount of restitution would be. The State got a guilty plea and the victims, who were involved in 
the plea agreement negotiations, were satisfied with the restitution amount. Plea agreements are 
:ontractual and there is no legal authority that requires a defendant to plead to taking the same 
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amount as agreed to be paid in restitution in a plea agreement. In other words, all that Defendant 
Verna Lombard needed to do in this case was plead to the elements of grand theft, she did not have 
to admit to taking the amount that she had agreed to pay as restitution in the Plea Agreement. 
However the District Court would not let her just plead to the elements of grand theft and rejected 
her plea and the Plea Agreement between the parties. This abuse of discretion forced Defendant 
Vema Lombard to stand trial on counts of Burglary and Grand Theft in which she had no chance of 
prevailing given her admissions to Detective Sergeant Jared. This abuse of discretion led to none 
of the parties receiving the benefit of the bargain that Vema Lombard entered with the State and the 
victims. 
Subsequently a jury found Vema Lombard guilty of Burglary and Grand Theft. Given that 
the admissions alone were enough to find Verna guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this was no 
surprise. While this case has always been about restitution, and we'll get to that in shortly, a 
summary of the evidence presented at trial is helpful for ultimately understanding the issue of 
restitution. 
The Eberts were allegedly approached by an individual who said that he bought an item from 
Mary Ann's Grocery that was not run up by Verna Lombard. It was the Eberts' belief that Vema was 
selling goods to individuals and would hit no sale on the cash register which would then not register 
as a saleable event on the till. Verna herself confirmed this to Sergeant Detective Jared and told him 
that she would take the money, hit no sale, give the customer change, and then pocket money from 
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the sale that registered on the till as a no sale. Vema herself admitted that she had being doing this 
since late June or early July of 2007 and took approximately $50 to $60 a day when she did this. 
Vema also stated that she did not take every day she worked from when she starting taking and that 
some times she hit no sale and did not pocket any money from that transaction. 
The State introduced video tape surveillance of Vema Lombard taken the day of her arrest 
and for a few days prior to her arrest in September of 2007. The tapes showed Verna working the 
cash register and at the very most by themselves only show Verna taking something from the till and 
putting it in her pockets. They tapes do not show how much was taken each incident and only show 
a brief period of time. 
The State matched the cash register tapes to the videos and established that Verna had 
actually sold product at times which the cash register tape reads no sale. The video tapes and the 
:ash register tapes themselves still fail to show how much were actually taken in even one incident 
md again were only for a few day period. In fact, the combination of the cash register tapes and the 
video tape only confirm what Verna admitted to Sergeant Detective Jared. 
The State then introduced cash register tapes for several years The cash register tapes by 
:hemselves establish nothing substantial. Don Ebert testified that there were legitimate reasons for 
lo  sale entries, the amount of legitimate no sale entries varied day to day, it was impossible to tell 
what employee run in a no sale entry from the tapes themselves, and the tapes themselves could not 
dentify an actual amount that was taken in even one incident. 
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So while the State failed to offer any substantial evidence at trial besides Verna Lombard's 
admissions regarding the amount taken per incident, the total number of incidents, and the total 
amount taken by Lombard, the admissions by Vema by themselves were enough to justify a finding 
of guilt by the jury. Which now leads us to the issue of restitution. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION N ORDERING A 
RESTITUTION AMOUNT THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS THUS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of the 
trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. 9 19-5304(7) and by the policy 
favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss. State v Smith, 144 Idaho 
587,692,169 P.3d 275,28 1 (Ct. App. 2007). "Restitution, however, may be ordered only for actual 
:conomic loss suffered by avictim, I.C. $9 19-5304(1)(a), (2), unless the parties consent to a broader 
eestitution order. See LC. 19-5304(9)." The determination of the amount of restitution is a question 
~f fact for the trial court whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. 
S'mith at 692, 169 P.3d at 281. An appellate court will not overturn an order of restitution unless an 
huse of discretion is shown. Id When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, 
he appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
3erceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of 
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such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before 
it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
At the restitution hearing (See Tr. pgs. 277-307), Don Ebert testified that he could not put 
a black or white number on how much Lombard allegedly took. At the hearing, he also testified that 
he could not identify the exact date that allegedly Lombard began taking money from the store, how 
many times Lombard allegedly took money from the store, and the exact amount for each transaction 
that was allegedly taken. In other words, Don Ebert testified that he could not identify the actual 
loss. 
Don Ebert further testified that it was impossible to determine the amount that was taken and 
.he District Court later agreed by saying that Verna Lombard caused the problem and lack of 
:videnee and thus Don Ebert's statistical model was appropriate to determine restitution. With all 
iue respect to the Don Ebert and the District Court, it was not, or is not, impossible to determine 
low much Vema took from the store. Its a matter of simple bookkeeping and accounting to 
ietermine how much "cash" should have been running through the business based on the sale of 
nventoly. Its then simply a matter of identifying the actual cash versus the amount of cash that 
;hould have been running through the store. Its certainly not impossible to determine that amount. 
The fact that the Eberts did not have adequate control of the financials does not excuse illegal 
:onduct, however it should also not open the door for restitution amounts based on speculation. 
<estitution is limited to the actual amount of loss and it's the State's burden to make this showing. 
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The State failed to make any showing of actual loss. The District Court is required to only award 
restitution supported by the preponderance ofthe evidence. The District Court abused its discretion 
by awarding restitution in an amount not supported by the preponderance of the evidence and there 
is not substantial evidence in the record to affirm the District Court's award of restitution in this 
matter. As such, the Defendant respectfully contends that the District Court's order of restitution 
be reversed. 
Restitution is limited to actual loss and thus should not be speculative at all. The statistical 
~nalysis offered by Don Ebert and subsequently adopted by the District Court is nothing but 
speculations. There is not one single factor in the models that do not require major assumptions. 
Don Ebert testified that he did not know the number of unlawful events that Vema engaged 
in, yet the models (See R. pgs. 1 12- 13) use no sale entries on the cash register tapes as a measure for 
.he number of unlawful events. As already established there are many legitimate reasons for no sale 
sntries. The legitimate entrees vary day to day, its impossible to determine what employee is 
"esponsible for the no sale entry, and numerous employees use the same register throughout a shift. 
The preponderance of the evidence does not show that no sale entrees is a reliable measure for 
lnlawful transactions. The preponderance of the evidence shows that no sale entrees are not a 
.eliable event indicator and is based entirely on speculation. Restitution is limited to actual loss not 
speculative loss. 
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Don Ebert testified that he did not know how much was taken each unlawful event, yet the 
model relies on a average takc per event which is calculated purely through speculation based on the 
amount of money Verna Lombard had on her when she was arrested. Don Ebert seeks to base the 
daily take for 523 days in one model and for 674 days in another model based only on the amount 
of money that Verna had on her person the date she was arrested. Not to mention that Verna told 
Sergeant Detective Jared that she had money on her person that was hers legitimately on the date that 
she was arrested. 
The model assumes the date that Verna allegedly began engaging in unlawful conduct. Once 
model starts with a date in 2004 and then assumes that she took every day she worked thereafter until 
the day she was arrested! The other model assumes that Vema began taking on the very first day that 
she worked and took every single day that she worked until the day of her arrest! There is absolutely 
no reliable evidence that Verna Lombard took from the store 523 straight days that she worked or 
that she took from the store 674 straight days that she worked. 
Restitution is limited to actual loss. Statistical calculations assuming unlawful events, 
amounts taken each unlawful event, daily takes, and days taken do not establish actual loss and are 
too speculative for restitution. The problems are almost too numerous to discuss. For example, in 
both models, Don Ebert assumes that on the date when Verna Lombard began taking, that she 
proceeded to take every single day until the date of her arrest. There is absolutely no substantial 
evidence that assumption is correct and its also highly unlikely someone would take every single day. 
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The point being is if this assumption is wrong, say for example illegal events occurred only every 
other day or only every third day then the amount is too high by half or too high by two thirds. 
Another example is assuming what the daily take is and multiplying it by the number of days 
which unlawful activity allegedly occurred. One model assumes 523 days of illegal activity and 
wants to calculate the average daily take based on 1 day. Again there is absolutely no evidence that 
what was taken one day was taken the next day and in this model, assuming only for illustrative 
purposes, if the daily take is twice as high ($160) as it should be ($80) then the amount would be 
inflated by $41,840. 
Restitution is limited to actual loss. The only reliable evidence regarding actual loss in this 
case is the admissions that VernaLombard make which would approximately total $2,800. However 
this also assumes she took every day from when she stated in fact that she did not. 
Its important to note that the victims agreed to $20,000 restitution in the Pleas Agreement. 
Its important to note that amount because it shows how speculative and erroneous the statistical 
models are. In one model the low end is almost $72,000 and in the other the high end is over 
$204,000. The question has to he asked why someone who thought their actual loss was a minimum 
of $72,000 and a maximum of $204,000 would ever agree to only $20,000 in restitution. 
Restitution is limited to actual loss. This actual loss needs to be proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence and cannot be based on speculation. No sufficient evidence was presented at the 
restitution hearing regarding actual loss. The preponderance of the evidence does not support the 
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District Court's restitution award in this matter. The District Court abused its discretion in awarding 
restitution based purely on speculation and assumptions without any foundational support. The 
restitution award is not based on substantial evidence in the record and Defendant Verna Lombard 
respectfully urges that the award must be reversed. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING VERNA 
LOMBARD BY CONSIDERING FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
The District Court obviously put a lot of weight in the statistical models prepared by Don 
Ebert when sentencing Verna Lombard in this matter. However as set forth above, these models are 
based entirely on assumptions and speculations and there is no justification for their use in this 
matter in setting a restitution amount. The consideration of these models as a restitution amount 
~nfluenced the District Court's decision on how long Verna Lombard's sentence would be with the 
District Court's intent that Verna be on probation for up to eight years in order to pay the restitution. 
4s set forth above, the restitution order is erroneous and needs to be set aside and any change in 
pestitution should also change the length of the Verna's probation. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a case that should have been resolved by the parties' written Rule 1 1 Plea Agreement 
~ u t  the District Court's abuse of discretion led to a jury trial that was a foregone conclusion based 
In the admissions made by Verna, a sentencing that relied upon assumptions and speculative 
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evidence regarding restitution, and a restitution order that is purely speculative and flies in the face 
o f  well established law regarding restitution. 
Vema Lombard acknowledges that her conduct was wrong and that she should be required 
to pay restitution. However just as importantly is the requirement that the amount o f  restitution be 
based only on the actual loss o f  the victims and that a restitution award needs to be based on a 
preponderance o f  the evidence. 
It was not impossible for the victims to establish their actual loss in this matter. The State 
failed to prove the victims' actual loss be apreponderance o f  the evidence. The only uncontroverted 
evidence that is reliable and is not based improperly on assumptions and speculations are Verna's 
admissions to Sergeant Detective Jared that she took $50 to $60 some days beginning the end o f  June 
or the first part o f  July 2007 and that sometimes she hit no sale and did not take any money. The 
video tapes do not show anything different. The cash register tapes do not show anything different. 
The combination o f  the video tapes and the cash register tapes do not show anything different. At 
the very most the restitution award should be limited to Vema's admissions. 
The statistical models offered by Don Ebert are entirely speculative and rely solely on 
assumptions and do not offer any evidence whatsoever about the actual loss in this matter. The 
District Court in this matter abused its discretion by refusing the parties' Rule 1 1  Plea Agreement, 
sentencing Vema Lombard based on its reliance of  the statistical models, and abused its discretion 
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n ordering restitution in an amount not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. This abuse 
~f discretion has caused the Defendant to suffer manifest injustice. 
The District Court clearly abused its discretion with regards to the restitution order and 
;entencing in this case. Neither the restitution order nor the sentence is supported by substantial 
:videnee in the record and as such, Verna Lombard respectfully requests that the restitution order 
md the sentence be reversed. 
DATED this 17th day of November, 2009. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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